Publications

Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending
89 Indiana Law Journal ___ (forthcoming 2014) (with Abby K. Wood)

Abstract | Paper

Are Ballot Titles Biased? Partisanship in California's Supervision of Direct Democracy
3 U.C. Irvine Law Review ___ (forthcoming 2013) (with Christopher S. Elmendorf)

Abstract | Paper | Appendix (Survey Instrument) | Voter Guide Language (.zip) | Replication data (coming soon)

Long Lines at Polling Stations? Observations from an Election Day Field Study
9 Election Law Journal 3 (2010) (with Zachary S. Markovits)

Abstract | Paper | Replication data (.zip)

Working Papers

The Geography of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA "Preclearance" After Shelby County (with Christopher S. Elmendorf)

Abstract | Working draft | Appendices and replication code

Economic Incentives For Attorney Representation in Civil Rights Litigation (with Sean Farhang)
(under review)

Abstract | Paper

In this paper we investigate whether, when Congress relies upon private lawsuits to implement a law, the details of the legislation can importantly influence the extent to which the private bar is mobilized to carry out the prosecutorial function. We ask: In statutes with private rights of action, can Congress substantially affect whether plaintiffs are represented by counsel? Using an original and novel dataset based upon review of archived litigation documents for cases filed in the Northern and Eastern Districts of California over the two decades spanning 1981 to 2000, we examine the effects of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which increased economic damages available to Title VII job discrimination plaintiffs, on their ability to secure counsel to represent them. We find that over the course of the decade after passage, the law substantially increased the probability that Title VII plaintiffs would be represented by counsel, and that in doing so it reversed a decade long trend in the opposite direction.     » Slides         · 2012 American Law and Econonmics Ass'n Annual Meetings (Stanford Law School)         · 2012 Western Empirical Legal Studies Conference (UCLA Law School)         · 2011 Law and Society Association Annual Meetings (San Francisco, CA)

Close Elections, Cross-Party Voting, and the Constitution

Abstract | Draft available upon request

Over the past 20 years, California state legislators have been elected by an average margin of 65-35 and historical data show that these elections are some of the most competitive in the state's history. These wide margins of victory are often cited as the source of gridlock in California's legislature. Upon closer inspection, however, the California Assembly has voted on 7400 bills since 1999 and only rejected 27 of them suggesting a high level of cooperation and party discipline and a lack of general legislative gridlock. Using electoral returns and roll call data in four states between 1992-2008, this paper explores the correlation between closely contested elections and legislator preferences. I find no evidence that legislators who prevail in extraordinarily close races are more likely to cooperate with the majority party. In fact, I find that competitive elections are less predictive of legislator preferences than are elections decided by wide margins. These findings challenge some of the assumptions that have motivated constitutional amendments aimed at increasing political competition in California and Washington, and that have driven redistricting reform efforts across the country.     » Slides         · 2010 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meetings (Chicago, IL)

In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns (with Abby K. Wood)

Abstract | Paper

	In this paper we investigate whether strict transparency laws influence the be- havior of political donors at the state level. We ask: to what degree does sunlight "disinfect" the political process? and to what degree does disclosure "chill" political speech? We utilize data sources on state campaign finance to measure the effect of campaign finance disclosure laws. Specifically, we measure the effect of strict disclosure on the behavior of donors. We find evidence that strengthening disclosure laws may mitigate the effects of other laws that make it easier to spend in elections. We further observe a decrease in the amount of per-capita contributions after states strengthen their disclosure laws. Finally, we observe that the effects of disclosure laws are not felt evenly among all types of contributors. Contributions by those who spend relatively large amounts are inelastic to increased costs in the form of exposure brought by disclosure requirements; those in the middle of the distribution spend less after disclosure laws are passed; and those who spend relatively small amounts actually increase their spending in response to stricter disclosure laws and practices. These findings have important implications for future jurisprudence about the chilling effects of transparency laws and the evolving regulation of campaign finance.     » Slides         · 2012 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Stanford Law School)         · 2011 American Political Science Association Annual Meetings (Seattle, WA)
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In Progress

The Geography of Racial Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for the Causation Question in Vote-Dilution Cases (with Christopher S. Elmendorf)

Regulate or Delegate? Implications for Election Law

Abstract

This project explores two interrelated questions at the intersection of political science and law that are rarely examined together: (1) under what conditions do legislatures delegate responsibility? and (2) what effect does delegation have on substantive policy choices? More specifically, I am interested in how different regulatory regimes affect the likelihood that a voter's ballot is counted. I begin by examining the legislative choice to directly regulate the administration of elections or to defer this responsibility to an administrative officer, board, or agency. I utilize a unique dataset of state laws to test the conditions under which legislatures delegated responsibility to implement provisions of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA). Using propensity scores from this model as a weight, I then measure the effect of delegation on various measures of election administration. Building on traditional principal-agent scholarship, I focus attention on the policy implications of delegation for political parties, special interest groups, and individual voters.

At-Large to In Charge: Judicial Remedies, Election Rules, and Group Representation

Abstract

Latinos are politically underrepresented in California. According to the 2010 Census, 37.6% of California's population identify as Latino, yet Latinos currently comprise just 15%, 20%, and 13% of the California Assembly, Senate, and Congressional delegation respectively. The disproportinately low ratio of representation to population persists at the local level as well. Of California's 100 most populous cities, 15 have a majority Latino population and 21 have a Latino population between 40% and 50%, although the rate of Latino representation on city councils fall well below these numbers. The data for school boards, county commissions, and boards of supervisors are similar. Though Latino children are the largest single population in California schools at 49%, less than 20% of school board trustees are Latino and a full two-thirds of California's school boards have no Latino members. In this paper, I trace the history and fallout of a California lawsuit against the Madera Unified School District. Though Latinos comprised 44% of the school distrct, no more than one Latino had ever been elected to the seven-member school board. In June 2009, after a judge enjoined one election and compelled the school district to draw trustee districts, four Latinos - a majority - were elected to the school board. Legal challenges to at-large voting systems are predicated on assumptions about voter preference, group identification, and policy outcomes. Madera is a useful test case for examining these assumptions in greater detail.

Constitutions and Credible Commitments: Predicting Capital Market Responses to Order and Law

Abstract

In this paper I examine the relationship between judicial independence and a country's bond market. Judicial independence is often celebrated both because it provides for the enforcement of economic promises between private parties and political bodies, and because it empowers courts to uphold constitutional commitments to political and civil liberties. Using publicly-available financial data and a new measure of judicial independence in 69 countries, I measure the extent to which a highly independent judiciary attracts domestic and foreign investments in government and sovereign bonds. I find a strong correlation between a stable judiciary--regardless of its independence--and investment rates. In other words, a judicial independence score that is stable across time is a stronger predictor of investments than a judicial score that is relatively high. These findings tease out a subtle, yet more precise mechanism for the law and economic theory of credible commitments.     » Poster (.pdf)         · 2010 Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (Yale Law School)